The effects of financial incentives for case finding for depression in patients with diabetes and coronary heart disease: interrupted time series analysis by McLintock, K et al.
The effects of ﬁnancial incentives
for case ﬁnding for depression
in patients with diabetes and coronary
heart disease: interrupted time
series analysis
Kate McLintock,1 Amy M Russell,1 Sarah L Alderson,1 Robert West,1 Allan House,1
Karen Westerman,2 Robbie Foy1
To cite: McLintock K,
Russell AM, Alderson SL,
et al. The effects of financial
incentives for case finding for
depression in patients with
diabetes and coronary heart
disease: interrupted time
series analysis. BMJ Open
2014;4:e005178.
doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2014-
005178
▸ Prepublication history and
additional material is
available. To view please visit
the journal (http://dx.doi.org/
10.1136/bmjopen-2014-
005178).
Received 3 March 2014
Revised 8 July 2014
Accepted 24 July 2014
▸ http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/
bmjopen-2014-005146
1Leeds Institute of Health
Sciences, University of
Leeds, Leeds, UK
2NHS England, Leeds, UK
Correspondence to
Dr Kate McLintock;
k.l.mclintock@leeds.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Objective: To evaluate the effects of Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF) incentivised case finding
for depression on diagnosis and treatment in targeted
and non-targeted long-term conditions.
Design: Interrupted time series analysis.
Setting: General practices in Leeds, UK.
Participants: 65 (58%) of 112 general practices
shared data on 37 229 patients with diabetes and
coronary heart disease targeted by case finding
incentives, and 101 008 patients with four other long-
term conditions not targeted (hypertension, epilepsy,
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma).
Intervention: Incentivised case finding for
depression using two standard screening questions.
Main outcome measures: Clinical codes indicating
new depression-related diagnoses and new
prescriptions of antidepressants. We extracted
routinely recorded data from February 2002 through
April 2012. The number of new diagnoses and
prescriptions for those on registers was modelled
with a binomial regression, which provided the
strength of associations between time periods and
their rates.
Results: New diagnoses of depression increased
from 21 to 94/100 000 per month in targeted patients
between the periods 2002–2004 and 2007–2011 (OR
2.09; 1.92 to 2.27). The rate increased from 27 to
77/100 000 per month in non-targeted patients (OR
1.53; 1.46 to 1.62). The slopes in prescribing for
both groups flattened to zero immediately after QOF
was introduced but before incentivised case finding
(p<0.01 for both). Antidepressant prescribing in
targeted patients returned to the pre-QOF secular
upward trend (Wald test for equivalence of slope,
z=0.73, p=0.47); the slope was less steep for non-
targeted patients (z=−4.14, p<0.01).
Conclusions: Incentivised case finding increased
new depression-related diagnoses. The establishment
of QOF disrupted rising trends in new prescriptions of
antidepressants, which resumed following the
introduction of incentivised case finding. Prescribing
trends are of concern given that they may include
people with mild-to-moderate depression unlikely to
respond to such treatment.
BACKGROUND
Long-term physical conditions are associated
with a high prevalence of depression; people
with diabetes or coronary heart disease
(CHD) have a twofold to threefold increased
lifetime risk.1 2 Such comorbidity can make
depression hard to recognise,3 4 worsens the
prognosis of both conditions1 5 6 and
increases healthcare and societal costs.1 7
The UK National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE) recommends case
ﬁnding for depression in people with long-
term physical conditions.8 9 The Quality and
Outcomes Framework (QOF) for general
practice was established in 2004 and
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Rigorous quasi-experimental design, demonstrat-
ing policy effects on patient populations within a
sample of general practices, that appears broadly
representative on key parameters.
▪ Further insights gained from comparison of
trends in patient populations targeted and non-
targeted by intervention.
▪ Relatively high ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio inherent in
use of routinely recorded data may have dimin-
ished the magnitude of observed effects.
▪ The absence of a control population of practices,
making it hard to rule out possibility that concur-
rent national and local initiatives contributed to
observed trends.
▪ Lack of data on patient outcomes, such as recov-
ery from depression or the appropriateness of
treatment.
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correspondingly rewarded case ﬁnding for depression in
all patients with a diagnosis of CHD or diabetes over
2006–2013 (QOF years 3–9). This indicator was known
as ‘QOF DEP1’ and deﬁned as, “the percentage of
patients on the diabetes register and/or the CHD regis-
ter for whom case ﬁnding for depression has been
undertaken on one occasion during the previous
15 months using two standard screening questions.”10
A designated clinical code indicating the use of these
questions was recorded in the patient record whenever
the Patient Health Questionnaire-2 was administered,
irrespective of the responses. Practices were reimbursed
according to the proportion of patients with a record of
case ﬁnding in the preceding 15 months. Payment
thresholds were set at achievements of 40–90% of eli-
gible patients until 2012, and 50–90% during
2012–2013. The indicator had a value of eight points
from 2006 to 2010 and six points from 2010 to 2013.
Each point was worth £133.76 in 2012–2013, the ﬁnal
year of incentivisation. This incentivised case ﬁnding has
now been withdrawn from the QOF because of doubts
over beneﬁts.11
The impact of this policy has been uncertain. The
effectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives in changing clinical
behaviour is limited12 and pay-for-performance schemes
often have unintended adverse consequences.13 More
speciﬁcally, a systematic review concluded that advances
in quality of care for long-term conditions included in
UK QOF were modest.14 There are few rigorous evalua-
tions of the effects of pay-for-performance given that
controlled comparisons are rarely acceptable to policy-
makers. Two interrupted time series evaluations of QOF
have not shown any sustained effects on processes of
care or clinical outcomes.15 16 While there are no coded
data prior to the introduction of the case ﬁnding indica-
tor, at face value the QOF did incentivise a change in
practice given that around 86% of patients with diabetes
and CHD have been coded as screened at least every
15 months since its inception.17 Yet there is no evidence
that case ﬁnding for depression, whether in the pres-
ence18 or absence of coordinated care systems,19 20
improves patient outcomes. A cohort study found a
greater likelihood of a new diagnosis of depression and
initiation of antidepressant treatment in the 28 days fol-
lowing QOF-incentivised case ﬁnding21; the longer-term
effects on the whole population eligible for case ﬁnding
are unknown. There may be further unintended effects
on populations with other long-term conditions not tar-
geted by incentivised case ﬁnding. Examining quality of
care across a number of conditions, Doran et al22 found
that improvements associated with QOF incentives
occurred at the expense of small detrimental effects on
aspects of non-incentivised care.
We evaluated the effects of incentivised case ﬁnding
on new depression-related diagnoses and new prescrip-
tions of antidepressants in patient populations with
long-term conditions targeted or not by ﬁnancial
incentives.
METHODS
Study design
We used an interrupted time series design to evaluate
the effects of incentivised case ﬁnding while accounting
for underlying secular trends. We also compared trends
in depression diagnosis and treatment between those
patient populations targeted by incentivised case ﬁnding
(diabetes and CHD) and other patient populations with
long-term physical conditions not targeted by incenti-
vised case ﬁnding (hypertension, epilepsy, chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) and asthma).
Our rationale was that we would not expect outcomes in
the non-targeted group to diverge from underlying
secular trends.
Practices and participants
We invited all 112 general practices in Leeds to share
anonymised patient data via the Information in General
Practice Team of the then National Health Service
primary care trust. No distinction was made between
users of different electronic records systems. Compared
with English indicators the physical health of people in
Leeds is generally worse and levels of deprivation are
higher.23 Recorded depression in adults is similar (both
around 11%)24 as is performance on the QOF incenti-
vised case ﬁnding indicator in our ﬁnal year of data col-
lection (87% for Leeds over 2011–2012 compared with
England average of 86%).17 25 We sought data on
patients with diabetes and CHD targeted by case ﬁnding
and data from other patients with the four comparator
and non-target, long-term physical conditions from QOF
registers. Patients with conditions in both targeted and
non-targeted groups were excluded from non-targeted
group analysis to avoid double counting. Therefore, any
change in outcomes in the non-targeted group could
not be attributable to individuals being screened
because they had a targeted condition.
Data collection
We collected retrospective, electronic data from
February 2002 through April 2012 for patients aged
18 years and over. Data were extracted through
Morbidity Information Query and Export Syntax
(MIQUEST) software used for collecting data from
general practice clinical computing systems in a consist-
ent and comparable way. The tool utilises a query lan-
guage that incorporates security and conﬁdentiality
safeguards; pseudoanonymisation supports the extrac-
tion of patient level information but ensures it is not
attributable to individual patients.26 Participating prac-
tices consented to the extraction of anonymised patient
data and did not need to take any further action.
We recognised that the diagnosis of depression was
likely to be under-recorded in clinical records because
of factors such as diagnostic uncertainty and patient
preference. The recording of certain diagnostic Read
Codes, such as ‘depressive disorder’, automatically trig-
gers alerts for further assessments required by QOF.
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Failure to meet these targets reduces practice income
and hence coding behaviour may have changed. We
therefore also searched for use of more sensitive but less
speciﬁc Read codes, such as ‘low mood’ or ‘depressed
mood’, that are not assessed by the QOF and included
these in our main outcome of diagnosis. We excluded
codes related to postnatal depression.
Data on the prescription of licensed antidepressant
drugs listed in British National Formulary section 4.3
were collected, with the exception of antidepressants
judged by clinicians involved in the project (RF, AH,
SLA, KM) to be more commonly prescribed for other
indications (eg, amitriptyline and nortriptyline for
neuropathic pain).27
A complete list of clinical codes for each outcome
measure is available as an electronic web appendix.
Data analysis
The denominators comprised the numbers of patients
on practice registers for each ﬁnancial year (starting 1
April) targeted by incentivised case ﬁnding (diabetes
and CHD) and those not targeted (hypertension, epi-
lepsy, COPD and asthma). We assumed that registered
long-term condition populations would be relatively
stable over each year. We took the number of registered
long-term condition populations per practice as constant
over each QOF year. This permitted a more parsimoni-
ous model to facilitate interpretation.
For each targeted and non-targeted patient group, we
analysed trends in new depression-related diagnoses and
antidepressant prescribing. We also examined the
uptake of case ﬁnding for depression. We recognised
that these trends could relate to changes in coding as
well as clinical practice; we mainly used their outputs to
guide interpretation of the main outcomes. Data were
aggregated by month for each of the 65 practices so that
each time series is 123 months long (February 2002 to
April 2012). Analysis was carried out at the practice level
using a binomial regression based on the calculated
numerators and the available denominators.
Discontinuities were modelled at key dates: April 2004
for the introduction of QOF and April 2006 for the
introduction of incentives for case ﬁnding for depres-
sion. A further discontinuity was introduced at April
2007 to isolate exceptional behaviour noted during the
QOF year April 2006 through March 2007. Our focus
and interest was on the long-term sustained effect seen
after the introduction of case ﬁnding incentives rather
than the immediate change. To avoid bias from this ﬁrst
year (2006/2007), rates were permitted to be different
in that year, thereby isolating it from the sustained effect
we sought to assess. For each time period (February
2002 to March 2004; April 2004 to March 2006; April
2006 to March 2007; April 2007 to April 2012) the
model has an overall constant and slope. Speciﬁc slope
terms were dropped when they were found not to be
statistically signiﬁcant from zero at the 5% level.
Fitting seasonal effects improved the model but added
complexity. As reference and intervention periods were
integer multiples of complete years, there would be no
perturbation of level or slope if explicit seasonality terms
were not included, but rather seasonality was encompassed
within the error term. As the proﬁle of seasonality
appeared to change from the reference period to the
intervention period and vary in the group with targeted
interventions compared with the group for other long-
term conditions, this option was selected to yield the clear-
est effect in the model. The model can be expressed as
Let YTit and YNit be random variables representing the
number of diagnoses at practice i in month t for tar-
geted and non-targeted patients, respectively. Then
Pr (YTit¼ yTit) ¼
nTit
yTit
 
p
yTit
Tit (1 pTit )ðnTit yTitÞ ð1Þ
where yTit [ {0; 1; . . . ; nTit};nTit is the relevant denom-
inator for practice i in month t, and pTit is the corre-
sponding rate of diagnosis. Using a logit link function in
the generalised regression, we model the rate pTit with
log
pTit
1 pTit
 
¼ mT0 þmTi þ bT1 þ 1t[2006
þ bT21t.2006 ð2Þ
and
mi [ N(0; s2) ð3Þ
where 1t[2006 is an indicator variable for the year 2006/
2007 and 1t.2006 is an indicator for the intervention
period, that is, after the year 2006/2007. Note that a
random intercept mTi is included to account for cluster-
ing within practices. Slope terms were also added where
appropriate. The open source software R 2.12.0 64 bit
version was used for all statistical analysis.28
RESULTS
We recruited 65 (58%) of 112 Leeds practices. Their
2012 QOF registers indicated that they served 37 229
patients with diabetes and CHD targeted for case
ﬁnding for depression and 101 008 patients with other
long-term conditions not targeted. Table 1 provides data
on all English practices and compares characteristics of
recruited and not-recruited practices.
Overall, the practices recruited were larger; however,
we found no signiﬁcant differences in Indices of
Multiple Deprivation, or total QOF scores. The majority
of practices used one clinical computing system by the
end of data collection. Tables 2 and 3 summarise the
annual incidences of case ﬁnding, depression-related
diagnoses and prescription of antidepressants by count
and rates per 100 000 patients, for targeted and non-
targeted patients.
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Practice-level analysis found signiﬁcant increases in
new coded case ﬁnding following the initiation of incen-
tives, also reﬂected in aggregated city-wide level trends
(ﬁgure 1). The exceptional rise in 2006 reﬂects ﬁrst
coding in patients with existing diagnoses of diabetes and
CHD. Comparing the period April 2004 to March 2006
with April 2007 to March 2012, rates of case ﬁnding
increased in the targeted population from 0.07 to 7.45/
1000 per month (OR 99.76; 95% CI 83.15 to 119.68) and
in the non-targeted population increased from 0.1 to
0.78/1000 per month (OR 7.54; 6.91 to 8.24).
Binomial regression of the practice level data con-
ﬁrmed statistically signiﬁcant rate increases in new
depression-related diagnoses in both patient populations.
In targeted patients, the diagnosis rate increased from 21
to 94/100 000 per month between the periods
2002–2004 and 2007–2012 (OR 2.09; 1.92 to 2.27). In
non-targeted patients, the rate increased from 27 to
77/100 000 per month (OR 1.53; 1.46 to 1.62). In
neither of these periods was the slope statistically signiﬁ-
cant from zero, that is, the rates can be assumed to be
constant during these periods. Figure 2 shows these
trends aggregated at a city level with ﬁtted constants and
slopes, indicated by dashed lines. Figure 3 shows the city-
level trends for new antidepressant prescribing with ﬁtted
constants and slopes. Rates of prescribing increased over
the full period of observation. During the period after
QOF was introduced but before incentives (April 2004 to
March 2006), the slopes for both populations ﬂattened to
zero (p<0.01 for both groups). For targeted patients, the
Table 1 Characteristics of general practices in England and those in Leeds that did and did not share data for the study
based on data published in 2012
Practice characteristics All England Recruited Not recruited p Value
Practices, n§ 8323 65 47
List size (patients, median)§ 5987 7182 4694 0.03
Under 18 years (%) 20.5 20.7 20.2 0.29
65 years and over (%) 16.2 14.5 15.8 0.05
Number of general practitioners in the practice (mean)¶* 4.4 5.3 4.2 0.04†
Male 2.4 2.5 2.2 0.28†
Female 2 2.8 1.9 0.02†
Inidices of multiple deprivation§ 23.9 28.5 28.9 0.88
Rural/Urban classification (% urban)§§* 84.9 96.9 97.9 0.93
Patient survey (%)§
Would recommend 85.9 83.2 82.8 0.8
Have a chronic disease 53.4 52.5 53.7 0.17
Carers 18.2 17.1 18.9 0.04
Working 60.1 61.7 58.9 0.13
Unemployed 5.2 5.76 6.42 0.91
Clinical computing system¶¶*
TPP systmOne 1494 42 33 –
EMIS (combined LV, PCS, Web) 4649 22 11 –
Other 2231 1 3 0.25‡
QOF (%)§
Total score 98.5 98.8 98.7 0.99
Exception rate 5.1 5.4 4.7 0.08
Chronic disease prevalence (%)§
CHD 3.4 3.6 4.1 0.03
Hypertension 13.9 13 13.8 0.04
Diabetes 4.7 4.4 4.6 0.48
Asthma 5.9 6 5.9 0.81
COPD 1.6 1.7 2 0.02
Depression 8.7 8.7 7.8 0.35
Epilepsy 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.04
Dementia 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.69
Data published 2012, except *2011. Averages are median unless otherwise stated. Comparison with Kruskall–Wallis test except †Student’s t
test when comparison of means was more appropriate, and ‡Fisher’s exact where comparison was between proportions. Comparison is
between recruited and not-recruited practices, there is no comparison to ‘All England’ as the local practices are also in this group and cannot
be compared with a group containing themselves.
§Public Health England. Fingertips. National Public Health Profiles. [Online]. 2012. http://fingertips.phe.org.uk/ (accessed 6 May 2014).
¶Health and Social Care Information Centre. NHS Staff—2001–2011, General Practice. [Online]. 2012. http://www.hscic.gov.uk/article/2021/
Website-Search?productid=4869&q=gp+numbers+2011&sort=Relevance&size=10&page=1&area=both#top (accessed 6 May 2014).
§§Health and Social Care Information Centre. Indicator Portal. [Online]. 2011. https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk/ (accessed 6 May 2014).
¶¶Direct enquiry to Health and Social Care Information Centre, May 2014. Reference NIC-270580-S0V6P. The total number of practices for
these data (2011) differ from the Practices, n denominator (2012) due to the different year of data collection.
CHD, coronary heart disease; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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slopes before the introduction of QOF and after the
exceptional year were similar (Wald test for equivalence
of slope, z=0.73, p=0.47). For non-targeted patients, the
slope for the latter period was less steep (Wald test for
slope, z=−4.14, p<0.01). All Wald tests for slopes were
undertaken using practice level data.
DISCUSSION
Incentivised case ﬁnding increased rates of new
depression-related diagnoses in patients with CHD and
diabetes and, to a lesser extent, in those with non-targeted
long-term conditions. The establishment of QOF dis-
rupted rising trends in new prescriptions of antidepres-
sants; these resumed following the introduction of
incentivised case ﬁnding, although there was a modest
deceleration in antidepressant prescribing for non-
targeted conditions. Rates of new prescriptions for antide-
pressants exceeded those for depression-related diagnoses.
Quasi-experimental evaluations of QOF have found no
sustained effects for other clinical indicators.14–16
Financial incentives in primary care tend to have modest
effects on relatively simple clinical behaviours such as
risk factor recording or test ordering.12 The nature of
targeted clinical behaviours is likely to inﬂuence the
effectiveness of incentives.29 30 Given that the QOF
incentives directly rewarded case ﬁnding, we sought and
found evidence of changed clinical practice ‘down-
stream’ to case ﬁnding. Previous research has found
associations between case ﬁnding for depression and
new diagnoses and antidepressant prescribing.21 31
However, our analysis of longitudinal data demonstrates
policy effects at a population level and highlights the
importance of accounting for secular trends and add-
itional insights from comparative data.
The mechanisms by which rates of depression-related
diagnoses increased remain unclear. The spike in diag-
noses immediately following incentivisation probably
Table 2 Annual numbers of case finding, new depression-related diagnoses and new prescriptions of antidepressants in
Leeds over 2001–2012 for conditions targeted or not by incentivised case finding
Year
Counts
New episodes of case
finding
New depression-related
diagnoses
New prescriptions for
antidepressants
Targeted Non-targeted Targeted Non-targeted Targeted Non-targeted
2001–2002 1 20 11 36 99 199
2002–2003 14 99 97 323 406 864
2003–2004 18 121 165 477 526 1163
2004–2005 17 144 218 687 575 1324
2005–2006 68 169 260 706 604 1312
2006–2007 13 363 1555 705 927 909 1429
2007–2008 4242 1089 438 985 871 1594
2008–2009 2741 800 423 860 925 1752
2009–2010 2809 1080 420 1003 1028 1921
2010–2011 2801 1691 458 979 1244 2195
2011–2012 2830 1755 435 937 1306 2319
Table 3 Annual incidences of case finding, new depression-related diagnoses and new prescriptions of antidepressants (per
100 000 patients) in Leeds over 2001–2012, for conditions targeted or not by incentivised case finding
Year
Rates per 100 000 patients
New episodes of case
finding
New depression-related
diagnoses
New prescriptions for
antidepressants
Targeted Non-targeted Targeted Non-targeted Targeted Non-targeted
2001–2002 0.0010 0.0058 0.0061 0.0138 0.1050 0.0662
2002–2003 0.0038 0.0072 0.0279 0.0286 0.1118 0.0794
2003–2004 0.0039 0.0088 0.0366 0.0441 0.1257 0.1057
2004–2005 0.0032 0.0103 0.0557 0.0710 0.1565 0.1354
2005–2006 0.0210 0.0121 0.0648 0.0664 0.1524 0.1314
2006–2007 3.3199 0.1450 0.1946 0.0907 0.2296 0.1359
2007–2008 1.0276 0.0989 0.1127 0.1077 0.2185 0.1564
2008–2009 0.7139 0.0732 0.1125 0.0918 0.2414 0.1674
2009–2010 0.7244 0.0850 0.1212 0.0952 0.2543 0.1774
2010–2011 0.6708 0.1293 0.1258 0.0905 0.2783 0.1843
2011–2012 0.6849 0.1254 0.1093 0.0805 0.2954 0.1973
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reﬂects coding patterns before general practitioners
began to realise they would trigger alerts for further
assessments required by QOF when recording
depression-related diagnoses. Similar phenomena have
been observed in the ﬁrst years of new QOF indicators.32
Following the introduction of incentivised case ﬁnding,
rates of new depression-related diagnoses rose in non-
targeted long-term conditions, coincident with only a
modest rise in recorded case ﬁnding in these patients.
Incentivised case ﬁnding may have directly affected path-
ways of care or, more generally, increased awareness of
the higher risk of depression in all patients with long-
term conditions. A combination of these explanations
seems likely for two reasons. First, we found strong evi-
dence of seasonality for coded case-ﬁnding but not for
new diagnoses or prescribing. Second, our parallel
ethnographic study of general practices demonstrated
the absence of a systematic approach to following up
and managing screen-positive cases.33 It remains uncer-
tain how the QOF and other payment for performance
systems work.34
The interpretation of prescribing trends is more chal-
lenging. Taking pre-QOF trends into account, new pre-
scriptions of antidepressants in patients with long-term
conditions plateaued following the introduction of QOF
before resuming the underlying trend in targeted condi-
tions when incentivised case ﬁnding for depression was
introduced. This plateau effect seems compatible with a
view that the initial introduction of QOF diverted atten-
tion from psychosocial aspects of long-term condition
care towards achieving biomedical targets.35 It is also
consistent with a longitudinal analysis of QOF in English
general practice, which found lower overall achievement
rates for non-incentivised indicators compared with pre-
dicted values than for incentivised indicators.22
Arguably, this might not represent a detrimental unin-
tended consequence in the case of a potentially over-
medicalised condition such as depression.36
The causes of on-going secular increases in antidepres-
sant prescribing have been debated.37 38 Hypotheses
include poor compliance with clinical guidelines that do
not recommend prescribing in the more commonly
encountered mild-to-moderate depression,39–41 an
increase in duration of antidepressant prescribing in
line with clinical guidelines rather than an increase in
the number of patients prescribed for,42 and the intensi-
fying effect of QOF on prescribing patterns.43 Our data
included only the ﬁrst prescription of any antidepressant
Figure 1 Rates of coded case
finding for depression in patients
with conditions targeted or not by
incentivised case finding,
2002–2012.
Figure 2 Rates of new
depression-related coded
diagnoses in patients with
conditions targeted or not by
incentivised case finding,
2002–2012.
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for each patient, indicating that our observed trends are
attributable to greater numbers of patients being treated
rather than extended periods of prescribing. Therefore,
our analysis supports the explanation that incentivised
case ﬁnding perpetuated the rise in antidepressant pre-
scribing because of a perceived need for clinical action
over and above referral for counselling or watchful
waiting.
The rate of antidepressant prescribing in this study
exceeded the rate of diagnosis of depression in targeted
and non-targeted groups; this trend was also reported by
Burton and colleagues.21 The limited use of clinical
codes in the diagnosis of depression is recognised.
Rather than a lack of diagnostic accuracy, it probably
reﬂects how clinical coding is not always a part of
routine practice and how general practitioners pragmat-
ically prescribe according to symptoms and responses to
treatment rather than diagnostic categories.44 45
While we drew on published guidance in conducting
this interrupted time series,46 47 we identiﬁed seven
main limitations. First, the high ‘signal-to-noise’ ratio
inherent in the use of routinely recorded data may have
diminished the magnitude of observed effects.48 Second,
the true denominator for the binomial regression varies
monthly as patients exit the denominator population
after undergoing incentivised case ﬁnding. There are
also variations due to patients dying and leaving the
practice. We used annual QOF reports for the denomin-
ator values and took them to be constant for that year.
As the denominator is large compared with the number
screened, the error of the model will be small. Third, we
were unable to examine patient outcomes, such as recov-
ery from depression, nor the appropriateness of treat-
ment. We explored the use of routinely collected
referral data but these were unreliably recorded and
prone to temporal changes in coding practices. Fourth,
targeted patients with diagnoses of diabetes and CHD
may include individuals with a greater number of
comorbidities than non-targeted patients.49 Depression
is more prevalent in patients with a greater number of
physical comorbidities,50 51 suggesting we were more
likely to identify depression-related diagnoses in this
group. Fifth, our analysis is based on one geographical
area with a response rate of 58%. However, the
characteristics of practices participating in the study
were broadly similar to those for England and the non-
participating practices. Sixth, observed trends may also
have been related to changes in practice computerised
record systems. Leeds practices began migrating to The
Phoenix Partnership (TPP) SystmOne after 2006 until it
became the majority provider in 2012 (table 1). The
choice of clinical computing system is associated with
variations in practice QOF performance.52 Seventh,
given the absence of a control population of practices, it
is possible that concurrent national and local initiatives
may have contributed to our observed trends. NICE
issued a clinical guideline on depression in 2004, which
was subsequently revised in 200941; even allowing for
delayed diffusion or anticipatory effects, it is unlikely to
explain any changes we observed from 2006 onwards.
Nor do the introduction of the Improving Access to
Psychological Therapies programme in Leeds from 2008
to 2009 onwards or publication of the NICE clinical
guideline on depression in adults with a chronic physical
health problem in 2009 offer plausible alternative expla-
nations.53 54 Furthermore, the isolation of the excep-
tional year when case ﬁnding incentives were ﬁrst
introduced permits us to infer with conﬁdence that we
observed sustained higher rates of diagnosis.
Given the sustained promotion of case ﬁnding for
depression across a range of long-term conditions and
for carers,8 9 55 there is a need for clearer guidance to
optimise the pathway and outcomes of care for case
ﬁnding-detected depression, including limiting anti-
depressant prescribing to patients most likely to beneﬁt.
Any effects of incentivised case ﬁnding need to be con-
sidered alongside costs. On the basis of payments
offered under the 2012–2013 UK QOF contract and
without considering opportunity costs, we estimate that
case ﬁnding for depression in CHD and diabetes cost
over £6 million per annum56 in the context of the £1
billion total estimated cost of QOF each year. These
Figure 3 Rates of new
antidepressant prescribing in
patients with conditions targeted
or not by incentivised case
finding, 2002–2012.
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costs, the limited beneﬁts we found, and the withdrawal
of incentivised case ﬁnding for depression demonstrate
the risk of rolling out policies in the absence of rigorous
supporting evidence. Although policymakers express
frustration when debates about evidence appear to hold
back service improvement,57 there are hazards in follow-
ing assumptions about how and whether apparently
simple but deceptively complex interventions such as
incentivised case ﬁnding work.58
The impact of the withdrawal of QOF incentivised
case ﬁnding for depression is not yet known. A retro-
spective longitudinal study suggested levels of perform-
ance remain stable across a range of clinical activities
following the removal of QOF incentives, although all
indicators studied were indirectly or partly linked to
activities that remained incentivised.59 The longer-term
effects of completely withdrawing an incentive, such as
case ﬁnding for depression, on clinical behaviour is
unknown and merits further research.
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